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The status of ‘victim’ of human rights violations carries considerable moral, political and legal implications for the individual and society at large while the status of ‘displaced person’, even though it also implies 
loss of choice in relation to residence and mobility, is usually responded to from 
operational and legal standpoints. As a result, the confluence of both statuses 
in the same person gives rise to a number of interesting legal and operational 
questions regarding State duties towards his or her protection, particularly 
when the cause of displacement challenges long-held assumptions, such as the 
involvement of criminal groups. This chapter seeks to explore the interplay 
between victimhood and displacement caused by criminal groups through 
Mexico’s General Victims’ Law [Ley General de Víctimas]1 while drawing 
parallels from Colombia’s experience with individuals displaced by criminal 
bands (the so-called BACRIM or bandas criminales), through its Victims’ Law 
[Ley de Víctimas].2 
The status of ‘victim’
Distinct and important factors fall within the wider issue of victimhood. 
Although this chapter focuses on the legal issues, these are permeated by 
extraneous factors, as in each society the identification and construction of 
the ‘victim’ concept is a social process reflecting its particularities.3 At the same 
time, this socially constructed image, which often corresponds to the concept 
of a ‘pure victim’ deserving of protection and assistance, rarely reflects the 
1 Ley General de Víctimas, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 9 Jan. 2013, amended on 3 May 
2013.
2 Ley 1148 of 2011, Por la cual se Dictan Medidas de Atención, Asistencia y Reparación 
Integral a las Víctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno y se Dictan otras Disposiciones, Diario 
Oficial no. 48.096, 10 June 2011, as last amended through Presidential Decree 4158 of 
2011, Diario Oficial no. 4.242 (3 Nov. 2011). A concise overview of the law is available in 
English in L. Forero-Niño, ‘Colombia’s historic victims and land restitution law’, Law and 
Business Review of the Americas, 18 (2012), 97.
3 For more information on this discussion, see the excellent paper in A.A. Marín, ‘Teoría 
crítica y derechos humanos: Hacia un concepto crítico de víctima’, Nómadas, 36 (2012). 
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complexity and diversity of victim-perpetrator relationships during situations 
of conflict and strife. As a consequence, defining victimhood is an inherently 
complex and contentious process.4
The international legal regime, which is not impervious to these tensions,5 
has developed two core documents on victims’ rights, namely: the Declaration 
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power;6 and the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.7 Despite their non-binding 
nature, these instruments have been central to the recognition of the special 
protection needs of victims of human rights violations and have influenced 
both domestic and international responses to this phenomenon.8 The Inter-
American Human Rights regime, applicable in equal measure to Mexico and 
Colombia, has also made considerable strides in pushing the borders of victim 
protection in the Americas. Its specific input on this issue will be studied in the 
following sections.
Context
In Mexico, internal displacement is caused mainly by violence between 
cartels, between cartel and government forces, and by the intimidation, land 
appropriation and violence inflicted directly and indirectly on the remaining 
population by these groups.9 As the situation of internal displacement has not 
been publicly acknowledged by the higher echelons of the federal government, 
precise data on its magnitude and the trends leading to it is fragmented and 
often imprecise. As individuals are displaced frequently but in small numbers 
per incident, and they join the rest of the country’s considerable internal 
4 E. Bouris, Complex Political Victims (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2007) and C. Hoyle and 
R. Young (eds.), New Visions of Crime Victims (Oxford: Hart 2002).
5 K. Bergtora Sandvik, ‘The politics and possibilities of victim-making in international law’, 
Revista da Faculdade de Direito do Sul de Minas, 27 (2012), 237.
6 UNGA, Resolution 40/34: ‘Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power’ (1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/34. 
7 UNGA, Resolution 60/147: ‘Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and 
reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law’ (2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/147.
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’, Human Rights Law 
Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (2006), p. 203; see further UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Study 
concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, final report submitted by Mr Theo 
van Boven, Special Rapporteur’ (1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8.
9 For a detailed overview of the situation in Mexico, see IDMC/NRC, ‘Forced displacement 
linked to transnational organised crime in Mexico’ (2012).
111THE DISPLACED AS VICTIMS OF ORGANISED CRIME
migratory flows, their particular situation remains invisible in most cases.10 
However, academia and civil society organisations have sought to document 
this phenomenon, estimating a total number of at least 281,400 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in 2014.11 
Although other estimates vary widely, these measurements appear to be 
quite conservative in light of particular periods of violence in the last decade. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has published a report 
on migration in Mexico and noted the difficulties in measuring internal 
displacement there, as well as harshly criticising the State for failing to enact 
legislation and take measures to address it directly.12 This opinion is shared by 
experts in the country,13 including one of the ministers (magistrates) of the 
Mexican Supreme Court.14 Despite this lack of regulation at the federal level, 
individual states have designed IDP assistance systems of their own, such as 
Chiapas,15 or have discussed them, as in the case of Sinaloa.16
In Colombia, understanding the agents behind internal displacement is 
even more complicated. The government has been engaged in a long-running, 
non-international armed conflict with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (FARC), which also clashed occasionally with other guerrilla 
groups and with paramilitary forces created by landlords and local politicians 
to defend themselves against guerrilla attacks. In time, more complex patterns 
of cooperation and confrontation between these actors emerged, depending 
10 S. Reynolds, ‘Las víctimas ocultas de México’, Refugees International Field Report, 2 July 
2014.
11 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Global overview 2015: people internally 
displaced by conflict and violence’ (2015) and Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción 
de los Derechos Humanos (CMDPDH), ‘En México 281 mil 418 personas son víctimas del 
desplazamiento interno forzado por la violencia’, 26 Feb. 2015, available at http://cmdpdh.
org/2015/02/en-mexico-281-mil-418-personas-son-victimas-del-desplazamiento-interno-
forzado-por-la-violencia/ (accessed 15 March 2016).
12 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human rights of migrants and other 
persons in the context of human mobility in Mexico’, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 48/13 (2013), 
pp. 102−5.
13 J.A. Guevara Bermúdez and M. Peguero, ‘La Comisión de Atención a Víctimas y 
el desplazamiento interno forzado’, 1 Dec. 2014, Animal Político, available at www.
animalpolitico.com/blogueros-verdad-justicia-reparacion/2014/12/01/la-comision-de-
atencion-victimas-y-el-desplazamiento-interno-forzado/ (accessed 15 March 2016).
14 J.R. Cossío Díaz, ‘Public policy to address displacement in Mexico’, Forced Migration 
Review, 48 (2014), 79.
15 Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de Chiapas, Decreto 
Número 158, Periódico Oficial del Estado Número 355, 22 Feb. 2012. 
16 Senator Zoé Robledo Aburto, ‘Proposición con Punto de Acuerdo por el que se Exhorta a 
la Secretaría de Gobernación y al Gobierno del Estado de Sinaloa a Impulsar Políticas para 
Atender a los Desplazados Internos Forzados en ese Estado, así como el Caso de la Defensora 
Esperanza Hernández’, 28 April 2015.
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on local circumstances and on their power to corrupt and invade government 
institutions. 
Eventually the largest paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) negotiated a demobilisation agreement with the government 
and laid down its arms, pledging to collaborate in truth-seeking and reparation 
mechanisms in exchange for reduced sentences for its members. However, not 
all paramilitary cells demobilised, and the sudden disappearance of some of 
them led to the creation and expansion of neo-paramilitary groups, which in 
most instances maintain the personnel, structure and business activities of their 
forebears. 
Dubbed BACRIM by the government (see opening paragraph), which 
placed them at the same level as other forms of organised crime, they were 
effectively excluded from the application of international humanitarian law 
and all other regulations relating to the armed conflict. This included the 
reparations for its victims provided by the Victims’ Law, despite the fact that 
they were and often still are pursued by military forces. Through this evolution 
of the armed conflict, the magnitude of internal displacement in Colombia 
is second only to war-torn Syria, reaching 6,044,200 IDPs in 201417 and 
with some sources attributing the majority of massive new displacements to 
these post-demobilisation groups.18 The consequences of this decision vis-à-vis 
victims’ rights will be explored in the next section.
The victims’ laws
In contrast with the process in Colombia, which has been several years in the 
making, the discussion in Mexico is largely forward-looking. In its current 
version, which incorporates amendments passed in May 2013, its victims’ 
law has been in force for just over two years. In fact, the government works 
constantly to develop the parameters and operational structures so that the 
goals set out in the law can materialise. Within a National System of Care for 
Victims, chaired by the President of the Republic, these implementing tools 
include an Executive Commission for Victims’ Care (Comisión Ejecutiva de 
Atención a Víctimas − CEAV) that, among other duties, manages a National 
Registry of Victims [Registro], a special fund [Fondo] for relief, assistance and 
reparations, and an office to provide legal advice to victims. To complicate 
matters further, some of these federal tools and institutions are mirrored in 
diverse forms at the state level.   
17 IDMC 2015.
18 See chapter 5 by Gabriel Rojas.
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As noted above, the value of a parallel between the Mexican and Colombian 
regulations is limited by the fact that the ‘armed conflict’ context is absent from 
Mexico’s analysis of the problem at hand. However, the fact that BACRIM 
are considered criminal and not armed groups paves the way for meaningful 
parallels. If it is true – and a challenge – that the Colombian victims’ law 
introduces traditional ingredients of transitional justice before the armed 
conflict has ended,19 the case of Mexico arguably presents a model of transitional 
justice outside any acknowledgement that a conflict exists. 
The original goal when the legislative proposal was presented was to 
aggressively repress organised crime and attend to its victims’ needs; the ‘war 
on drugs’ rhetoric never implied that the laws of war were to apply, even when 
this ‘war’ was often fought with military units on the frontline. The original 
proposal for a victims’ law identified a number of crimes generally attributed 
to cartel and connected gang members, such as murder, torture, kidnapping, 
disappearance, extortion and assault, and offered victims of those crimes 
monetary compensation in cases where the perpetrator could not be found or 
convicted, as well as symbolic recognition of their status as victims.
The law that was eventually adopted, under the next presidential 
administration, takes a much broader approach to the concept of ‘victim’, 
victims’ rights, and to the State’s responsibilities. This results from continued 
advocacy by civil society and human rights groups, who insisted that the ‘true’ 
ailments of the Mexican system be recognised, including not only abuse by State 
and non-State actors in the ‘war on drugs’, but also impunity and corruption. 
In fact, the law’s scope is so wide that it transcends the context within which 
it was conceived. Not only is there no reference to the ‘war on drugs’, but it 
is not even clear that the victims of organised crime – as opposed to crime 
tout court – are meant to be the prime beneficiaries. It is only in the opening 
paragraph of the explanatory memorandum that mention is made in passing to 
the ‘increasing public insecurity and expansion of organised crime’ the country 
is undergoing. In contrast, the Colombian law, rejecting more comprehensive 
standards in previous legislation,20 strove to draw the boundaries of victimhood 
carefully, defining victims for its own purposes as those adversely affected by 
the armed conflict since 1 January 1985. 
The Mexican victim law’s objective is, consequently, set as broadly as possible, 
namely ‘to recognize and guarantee the rights of victims of crime and human 
19 R. Uprimny Yepes, M.P. Saffón Sanín, C. Botero Marino and E. Restrepo Saldarriaga, 
¿Justicia transicional sin transición? Verdad, justicia y reparación para Colombia (DeJuSticia 
2006); J. García-Godos and K. Andreas O. Lid, ‘Transitional justice and victims’ rights 
before the end of a conflict: the unusual case of Colombia’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 
42 (2010), 487; and N. Summers, ‘Colombia’s victims’ law: transitional justice in a time of 
violence conflict?’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 25 (2012), 219.
20 Such as those in Leyes 387 of 1997, 418 of 1997, 548 of 1999, 782 of 2002, 1421 of 2010.
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rights violations’. Crime [delito] is defined as any ‘act or omission sanctioned 
by criminal law’, whereas ‘human rights violation’ is ‘any act or omission that 
may affect the human rights recognized in the Constitution or in international 
treaties’.21 In this last case, the agent must be either a government official, 
a private person exercising public functions, or a private person induced or 
authorised by an official or acting with his or her consent or cooperation.22 In 
regard to this classification, it is also important to note that the Inter-American 
Court has stated that violations to freedom of movement can also occur when 
the State does not provide the means to ensure its exercise,23 even when threats 
to this exercise come from non-State actors.24 Likewise, the Court has also 
highlighted the State’s duty to take measures to prevent displacement25 when 
there are indications that it could occur.26 
The status of victim under national legislation
There are thus two opposites: a broad definition of victim in Mexico and a 
restrictive definition in Colombia. Both approaches are complicated. Creating 
too wide a definition risks including even individuals who are victims of petty 
crimes and introduces insurmountable budgetary and institutional challenges, 
while too narrow a definition raises issues of arbitrariness. Therefore, it is 
probably impossible to achieve ‘fairness’ in every case, so perhaps ‘reasonableness’ 
is what definitions should aim for.
In this respect, although the Mexican law sets no time limit for awarding 
compensation for past violations or crimes, the artificial limit of 1985 set by 
the Colombian law seems far too restrictive in the context of a conflict that has 
lasted over half a century. The Colombian Constitutional Court has, however, 
defended this limitation, stating that in setting these restrictions Congress had 
reasonably and proportionately exercised its authority to establish a particular 
group of victims that would benefit from a special set of measures. This did not 
imply that individuals falling outside the scope of the law were not victims 
21 Article 6.
22 Ibid.
23 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 
192 (27 Nov. 2008), para. 139; Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala (preliminary 
objections, merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 250, 4 Sept. 2012, para. 175 
and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia (Merits, reparation and costs), IACtHR series 
C no. 213 (26 May 2010), para. 197.
24 Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 
237 (24 Nov. 2011), para. 162; Case of Lysias Fleury et al. v. Haiti (merits and reparations), 
IACtHR series C no. 236 (23 Nov. 2011), para. 93 and Cepeda Vargas para. 197.
25 Case of the Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala (preliminary objections, merits, 
reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 284 (28 Aug. 2014), para. 167.
26  Case of Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela (merits), IACtHR series C no. 256, 27 Nov. 
2012, para. 131.
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retaining a right to pursue reparations through ordinary channels.27 Whereas 
it is indeed true that ordinary justice mechanisms exist for this purpose, their 
ability to respond effectively to the enormous number of victims must be seen 
against the backdrop of the country’s systematic failure to ensure consistent 
and efficient access to justice.28
Having established these general boundaries, it is important to understand 
if and how the displaced fit within these concepts. In the case of Mexico and its 
broad definition of ‘victim of crime or human rights violation’, it appears that 
the law offers several ‘entry points’ – some relatively straightforward, others 
requiring a more creative interpretation. The law defines a ‘direct victim’ as 
a person who has suffered economic, physical, mental or emotional harm/
impairment, or any endangerment of or damage to his or her legal assets or 
rights in general, as a consequence of a crime or violations of his or her human 
rights having been committed, as recognised in the constitution and in those 
international treaties to which Mexico is a party. ‘Indirect victims’ are their 
family members and dependants while ‘potential victims’ are those who are 
victimised because they have assisted a victim or attempted to prevent or stop 
the crime or violation. 
What the law does not specify is whether such ‘potential victims’ would 
also be entitled to reparation in cases where their protection requires them to 
be evacuated in some way. This would arguably be a ‘displacement’ scenario 
that could be extrapolated to the probably more common situation when 
persons under threat flee preemptively before the feared encounter happens. 
In this context, although the question of whether this sort of flight should 
be recompensed remains open, the CEAV has recently developed guidelines 
to pay for the transportation costs of victims when they face a risk to their 
life or integrity, or need to access the authorities to file a complaint or receive 
treatment.29 
27 Corte Constitucional, C-253A/12 (2012).
28 If smaller groups of victims of events that happened many years ago failed to receive justice 
at the domestic level (see the Inter-American Court’s judgement on the 1985 Palacio de 
Justicia attack: Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (Persons Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. 
Colombia (preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 287, 
14 Nov. 2014, is it reasonable to expect swift access to justice and reparation for the millions 
of victims of the armed conflict? A similar problem has occurred in executing the justice 
mechanism for victims of the original paramilitary groups during the implementation of 
the Justicia y Paz [Justice and Peace] law, whereby perpetrator conviction and the reparation 
made have benefited only a minuscule percentage of all cases (International Crisis Group, 
‘Transitional justice and Colombia’s peace talks’, Latin America Report no. 49 (2013), pp. 
3−6.
29 CEAV, ‘Acuerdo del Pleno por el que se instruye a los titulares de las unidades 
administrativas de la asesoría jurídica federal, de administración y finanzas y de atención 
inmediata y primer contacto de la Comisión Ejecutiva de Atención a Víctimas para brindar a 
las víctimas los apoyos necesarios para su traslado’, 18 Sept. 2014.
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A similar categorisation between different classes of victims was also included 
in the Colombian law and its regulatory decrees, with the additional concept 
of a ‘collective victim’ in the case of indigenous, Afro-descendant and Roma 
groups.30 A parallel concept of collective victims exists in the Mexican law,31 
but it remains unregulated and vague, and in that respect a local adaptation 
of the Colombian example might help to enhance protection to Mexican 
indigenous communities that the cartels have expelled from their territories in 
order to appropriate the land.32
The displaced as victims of human rights violations
Beyond these potential ‘entry points’ in the general definition of ‘victim’ in 
the existing legislation, it is appropriate to consider the specific type and 
characteristics of victimhood that displacement can entail. This section 
considers three approaches to displacement: 1) as a human rights violation 
in and of itself; 2) as an aggravating circumstance; and 3) as a consequential 
violation.
Displacement as an independent human rights violation
Displacement per se is not a crime under Mexican law, although in some cases 
it may fit within the wider definition of ‘threat’ or ‘extortion’, and as such the 
‘crime’ entry point cannot be used to include the displaced within the law’s 
parameters. This is likely the reason why the CEAV has been outspoken in 
publicly recognising forced displacement and calling for its criminalisation,33 
as that would offer a straightforward entry point for the displaced into the 
reparation programme. However desirable this might be in practice, the human 
rights dimensions of displacement should not be ignored, as they are not only 
central to the dignity of its victims but also reflect the State’s international 
obligations. 
Beyond the criminal perspective, it is clear that displacement is a violation of 
the connected human rights to choice of residence and freedom of movement 
contained both in the constitution34 and in international treaties to which 
30 Decrees 4633 of 2011, 4635 of 2011 and 5634 of 2011, respectively.
31 Article 4.
32 D.J. Cantor, ‘The new wave: forced displacement caused by organized crime in Central 
America and Mexico’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33 (2014), 34; and Prisma, Pueblos indígenas 
y comunidades rurales defendiendo derechos territoriales (2014).
33 Q. Morelos, ‘Piden tipificar como delito el desplazamiento forzado por violencia’, 8 July 
2014, available at www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2014/07/17/victimas-piden-tipificar-
como-delito-el-desplazamiento-forzado-frente-a-violencia-en-el-pais-4683.html (accessed 16 
March 2016).
34 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación 5 Feb. 1917 (amended), Article 11.
117THE DISPLACED AS VICTIMS OF ORGANISED CRIME
Mexico is a party.35 These imply among other things the right to choose the 
place of residence within one’s country and not to be forcibly displaced within 
or from it.36 Likewise, involuntary exile may implicate the State in a violation 
of the right to choice of residence, as the Human Rights Committee has found 
on other occasions.37 A ‘right not to be displaced’ can thus be read into the 
right to freedom of movement and residence in both the universal and Inter-
American human rights regimes. 
This stand-alone approach has long been standard in Colombia. The rights 
to freedom of movement and choice of residence are also enshrined in the 
constitution,38 and IDPs were recognised as such in Law 387 of 1997, with 
an extensive definition covering different causes for said displacement that is, 
importantly, not limited to armed conflict, and recognising a ‘right not to be 
forcibly displaced’.39 This legislative process interacted substantially with the 
Constitutional Court’s 2004 landmark T-025/04 judgment, where it declared 
the massive level of forced displacement an ‘unconstitutional state of affairs’ 
and ordered strong State actions to protect this population, an order which it 
has overseen periodically ever since.
Displacement as an aggravating circumstance
Even if displacement is not regarded as a violation or crime in and by itself, it 
may be found to aggravate the situation of individuals who faced a different 
violation, such as torture or assassination attempts, and subsequently fled. 
This position has been particularly common in the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisprudence in cases of transboundary displacement.40
35 Article 22 of the Inter-American Convention and Article 12.1 of the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171. See further Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 27: Freedom of 
Movement’ (Art.12)’, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999). It should be noted further 
that Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution established that human rights dispositions should 
be interpreted in accordance with the constitution and international treaties and through the 
pro persona principle.
36 Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 
111, 31 Aug. 2004, para. 115; Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname (preliminary 
objections, merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 124, 15 June 2005, para. 
110; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR 
series C no. 134 (15 Sept. 2005), para. 188; Case of the Afro-Descendant Communities 
Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia (preliminary 
objections, merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 270, 20 Nov. 2013, para. 
219 and Human Rights Defender para. 165.
37 Human Rights Committee, Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, Communication no. 859/1999, 25 
March 2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999 and HRC General Comment no. 27.
38 Constitución Política de 1991 (1991), Article 24.
39 Article 2.
40 Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras (preliminary objection, merits, reparations and 
costs), IACtHR series C no. 99, 7 June 2003, paras. 127 and 132; Case of Maritza Urrutia v. 
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The list of ‘general victims’ rights’ in Article 7 of the law suggests that such 
an approach is possible in the case of displaced Mexicans, since it includes 
both the right to family reunification and the right ‘to return to one’s place 
of origin or to relocate in conditions of voluntariness, safety and dignity’. 
Another relevant reference is to be found in the principles contained in Article 
5 through the principle of ‘differential and specialised focus’, according to 
which certain harms require specialised care in response to the peculiarities and 
vulnerabilities of the victims. 
In application of this principle, all competent authorities are required to 
offer special guarantees and protection measures to categories of people who 
are exposed to a greater risk of violations, including migrants and IDPs. In 
fact, Article 38 explicitly directs the National Family Protection System 
(Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia − DIF) and its local 
counterparts to provide shelter to individuals who are displaced from their 
place of residence for as long as is needed for them to overcome the emergency 
and return to their homes freely and in safety and dignity. These references are 
in fact the only instances in which displacement is included in the law itself.
Displacement as a consequential violation
In July 2014 the CEAV adopted a third approach, which appears to be a middle 
path between the previous two. This approach is laid out in a recognition that 
displacement is an ‘additional victimising fact beyond that which originally 
caused the inscription of the individual as victim’.41 In this groundbreaking 
document, the Commission further noted that internal displacement 
is a complex phenomenon that has three main effects: 1) a break with life 
before displacement, causing harm to personal and family life; 2) a loss or 
endangerment of access to the rights that constitute a dignified life; and 3) 
Guatemala (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 103, 27 Nov. 2003, paras. 
159−60; Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala (preliminary objections, merits, reparations 
and costs), IACtHR series C no. 212, 25 May 2010, para. 278; Case of Barbani Duarte et al. 
v. Uruguay (merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 234, 13 Oct. 2011, paras. 
248−9; Case of García Lucero et al. v. Chile (preliminary objections, merits and reparations), 
IACtHR series C no. 267, 28 Aug. 2013; Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. 
Dominican Republic (preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), IACtHR series C 
no. 282, 28 Aug. 2014, paras. 479−82; Moiwana paras. 195−6; Castillo González v. Venezuela 
para. 131; Fleury para. 137−46.
41 CEAV, ‘Acuerdo del pleno por el que se reconoce que la situación de desplazamiento interno 
focalizado por actos de violencia debe ser, primero, reconocida por la Comisión Ejecutiva 
de Atención a Víctimas como un hecho victimizante adicional al que originalmente haya 
motivado la solicitud de inscripción de una persona en el Registro Nacional de Víctimas, y, 
segundo, atendida con un enfoque diferencial y especializado’, 29 July 2014.
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the occurrence of situations of special vulnerability that place victims at risk of 
further violations of their rights.42
Interestingly, the discussions between commissioners during the formulation 
and approval of the recognition document are also included in its minutes, 
shedding some light upon the evolution and theoretical construction of this 
response to displacement. One commissioner’s main objection was that since 
Mexico was not undergoing an armed conflict, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement43 were not applicable, and as a result the situation in 
Mexico could not be characterised as internal displacement. This position was 
turned down by the majority, but the discussion itself is important for what it 
represents in the process of identifying internal displacement in the country.
Firstly, the fact that the discussion hinged around what is or is not 
included in the Guiding Principles recognises their importance and is in itself 
a positive development, as it reflects the Inter-American Court’s position 
on the Guiding Principles’ centrality in interpreting States’ international 
obligations in displacement situations,44 particularly Article 22 of the Inter-
American Convention.45 At the same time, a clear thread is revealed between 
these international standards and the construction of a national response to 
the issue. Beyond this, the CEAV’s final position on whether the Principles 
were applicable to displacement patterns in Mexico does indeed reflect 
international standards, as both the Principles’ authoritative annotations46 and 
the interpretative labour of the Inter-American Commission47 underpin the 
fact that using the term ‘in particular’ when listing situations in their preamble 
that cause internal displacement indicates that it is not a closed list but rather 
a list of examples of such scenarios. As such, the application of the ejusdem 
generis rule indicates that other situations sharing common characteristics with 
42 The issue of the complex nature of displacement and how it implies the creation of this 
special situation of vulnerability to further violations has been highlighted by the Inter-
American Court. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia (preliminary objections, merits, 
reparations and costs), IACtHR series C no. 148, 1 July 2006, para. 209 and Case of the 
Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador (merits, reparations and costs), 
IACtHR series C no. 252, 25 Oct. 2012, para. 195.
43 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements (1998) UN Doc. E/
CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 Feb.
44 See, inter alia, Moiwana para. 111; Chitay Nech para. 140; Ituango para. 209. See further 
Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (preliminary objections and reparations), 
IACtHR Series C no. 259, 30 Nov. 2012, paras. 255−82.
45 Santo Domingo Massacre para. 256; Río Negro Massacres para. 173; Moiwana para. 111 and 
Chitay Nech para. 140.
46 W. Kälin, Guiding principles on internal displacement: annotations (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 4.
47 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human rights of migrants and other 
persons in the context of human mobility in Mexico’, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 48/13 (2013), 
36.
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those described in this list should also be covered by its provisions, including 
forms of violence that cannot be characterised as armed conflict.
Although this development has not been followed by a formal 
acknowledgment of internal displacement by the higher branches of the federal 
government, this breakthrough, as well as cases currently before the Inter-
American Commission,48 make ignoring internal displacement increasingly 
untenable for the State as a whole. On the other hand, the CEAV’s position 
can also be a tacit technical recognition of internal displacement, avoiding a 
politically sensitive high-level declaration to that effect.
Despite the considerable advances reflected in this document, there 
is a considerable flaw in its approach. Since displacement is considered a 
consequential ‘victimising fact’, a displaced person would not be able to 
gain recognition as a victim if a previous victimising fact did not exist. For 
instance, individuals who flee preemptively due to fear of suffering the side 
effects of violence in their home areas could be excluded from the benefits 
of the law, as they would not yet have been victimised. This would create a 
considerable protection gap, which should have been foreseen. Experience in 
the parallel field of refugee law, for instance, highlights the preventive aspects 
of displacement itself, with the 1951 Convention49 recognising the protection 
needs of individuals who flee due to a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution and 
not only those fleeing actual past persecution. This underscores the importance 
of acknowledging that individuals need not and should not be expected to wait 
until they have been harmed before fleeing to seek protection elsewhere. 
Displacement as a source of particular protection needs
Beyond the definitional aspects of the victim/displaced debate, the particular 
situation of displaced individuals also affects the implementation of Mexico’s 
Law in other respects.
Firstly, the circumstance of displacement should be recognised as 
complicating the victim’s access to protection and assistance measures, starting 
with registration itself. Had the possibility for IDPs to be registered as such been 
in place since the beginning of Mexico’s ‘war on drugs’, this documentation 
would constitute a significant input into the new national registry. Regrettably, 
no such registry exists. 
48 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 14/2015: Precautionary 
Measure no. 77-15, Defenders E. and K. and their relatives, Mexico, 27 April 2015, and 
Resolution 15/2015, Precautionary Measure no. 106-15, Cruz Sánchez Lagarda and others, 
Mexico, 27 April 2015.
49 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 
April 1954) 189 UNTS 137.
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Instead, there is a risk that the displaced’s historical ‘invisibility’ might add 
to their burden of proof. Since in the case of late registrations the authorities 
should investigate why they were not made sooner with applicants being 
required to show ‘good cause’50 for any delay, this can complicate access to 
protection, assistance and reparation measures. However, the situation of 
displaced individuals with particular vulnerability, which the CEAV has 
recognised,51 and the lack of a previous registry should be considered good 
cause in these cases. Unless these circumstances are considered to constitute 
extenuating circumstances prima facie, the displaced may end up being 
discriminated against in their access to registration and hence to the protection 
of the law.
Secondly, these particular circumstances and vulnerability are also reflected 
in a needs-oriented approach towards protection and assistance. The CEAV’s 
document on displacement and the Law’s Regulation [Reglamento]52 have 
recognised that internal displacement places its victims in a situation where 
they frequently lack documentation, have difficulties in exercising their rights 
and may have special medical, psychological, legal and social welfare needs. The 
Law’s Regulation also establishes that committees within the CEAV, including 
one on (among other topics) displacement,53 are obliged to design a wide array 
of measures to promote prevention, attention and reparation of victims in their 
respective areas of competence.54 
Other documents have also highlighted this shift in the Commission’s 
approach to the particularities of internal displacement. In its protocol for 
health services the Commission included, among other groups, the ‘victims of 
internal displacement’, quoting the Guiding Principles’ definition, reiterating 
the special needs deriving from their particular situation and establishing 
that attending to their needs requires a specialised approach.55 This particular 
protocol is part of the larger ‘Comprehensive Model of Support for Victims’ 
[Modelo Integral de Atención a Víctimas]56 frequently mentioning displaced 
individuals and mostly highlighting their particular needs as a group.57 
50 Article 100 (VII).
51 See the previous section.
52 Reglamento de la Ley General de Víctimas, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 28 Nov. 2014.
53 ‘Comité sobre Derechos Económicos, Sociales, Culturales y Ambientales, y Tema de 
Desplazados’ (Commitee on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights and 
Displacement Affairs), as established in the Acuerdo CEAV/PLENO/2014/028/05 of 15 
April 2014.
54 Article 39.
55 CEAV, ‘Modelo de Atención Integral en Salud’ (2014).
56 CEAV, ‘Modelo Integral de Atención a Víctimas’ (2014).
57 See, e.g., under the topics of restitution on p. 34 and the discrimination and poverty section 
on p. 18. 
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Likewise, Annex 3 of the Model, which establishes the registration form to be 
used during the Commission’s first contact with the alleged victim, includes in 
its general information section a checkbox so that the individuals may indicate 
whether they have been displaced by violence.58 
Thirdly, the externally displaced, who may or may not be refugees, will 
face the additional obstacle of physical distance from the national registration 
process, even though they are entitled to declare themselves before any 
embassy or consulate abroad if other authorities are inaccessible, or if they are 
domiciled in a foreign country.59 In such cases, they should register through 
a Mexican diplomatic representation, which will not necessarily exist close to 
their place of residence. However, it looks as if future regulations will help 
improve implementation in this area. For instance, the Law’s Regulation has 
established a coordination mechanism between the CEAV and the Ministries 
of Government (Interior) and Foreign Affairs for the ‘attention, assistance 
and opportune, quick and effective protection of foreign victims or Mexican 
victims abroad’, including measures for repatriation of corpses if the victims 
die abroad.60 This new push for coordination between the three institutions can 
potentially open the door for further advancement in creating standards that 
will adequately take into account the particular situation of Mexican victims 
abroad.
In Colombia, policymakers have hardly focused on the plight of the 
externally displaced, but State obligations towards them under human rights 
law are clear61 and can be accommodated under the Victims’ Law, although 
host governments could raise questions of cessation of refugee status.62 Ideally, 
however, these individuals would also be classified into a distinct category of 
their own as forcibly displaced individuals. They would then benefit from 
measures especially tailored to their needs both as displaced and as victims, since 
an approach denying either category would be unequivocally short-sighted.
Lastly, the Mexican Victims’ Law creates an avenue for input from 
international fora and organisations which can impact on the determination 
of victimhood within the CEAV through a two-tier system.63 In the first case, a 
decision on victim status made by an ‘international jurisdictional organ for the 
protection of human rights whose competence is recognized by Mexico’, such as 
58 CEAV, ‘Modelo Integral de Atención a Víctimas’ (2014), p. 194.
59 Articles 98 and 107.
60 Articles 16 and 17.
61 D.J. Cantor, ‘Restitution, compensation, satisfaction: transnational reparations and 
Colombia’s victims’ law’, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, research paper no. 215 
(2011).
62 Ibid. In fact, the beginning of the peace process in the country has seen refugee recognition 
rates for Colombian asylum-seekers plummet.
63 Article 110.
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the Inter-American Commission and Court or the Human Rights Committee, 
leads to an automatic determination of victim status by the CEAV, which is 
evidently a practical way to streamline Mexico’s international commitments 
through its national mechanisms. 
In the second case, the determination made by an ‘international organisation 
for the protection of human rights whose competence is recognized by 
Mexico’ may be taken into consideration by the Commission. In the case 
of displacement, this leaves an open door for the Offices of the UN High 
Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) and for Human Rights (OHCR) to 
advocate and be actively involved. Additionally, although it seems unlikely to 
happen in practice due to most destination countries for Mexican asylum-
seekers having their own refugee status determination (RSD) systems, it 
is possible to consider that, in countries without their own RSD systems, 
UNHCR’s mandate RSD of Mexican nationals might functionally make it a 
‘jurisdictional organ’ for the purposes of Article 110.
Displacement status versus victim status 
Having seen that the relationship between the ‘victim’ and ‘displaced’ labels is 
fluid, it is important to consider the practical implications of the discussion on 
the merits and perils of categorisation. The Colombian practice of recognising 
that BACRIM cause displacement64 and simultaneously considering whether 
and how to fit their actions into the Victims’ Law is a perfect example of what 
can happen in these circumstances.
As mentioned earlier, the Victims’ Law was specifically directed at the victims 
of the armed conflict after 1 January 1985. Since BACRIM are considered 
criminal groups and not parties to the armed conflict, this meant that their 
victims could not receive the benefits that law provided. Attempts to challenge 
this exclusion judicially by reference to the BACRIM’s criminal nature failed,65 
but unexpected results came from the institutional gaps that the Victims’ Law 
created on its own. 
One of the changes provided by the law was the elimination of the previous 
IDP registry (Registro Único de Población Desplazada) and replace it with a new 
and wider victims’ registry, the Registro Único de Víctimas, which would, in 
theory, recognise IDPs’ status as a particular group of victims within the larger 
group of all victims of the armed conflict. However, as this new mechanism 
linked registration to the fulfilment of the law’s definition of victim, individuals 
displaced by groups not considered to be armed groups taking part in the 
conflict − in this case, BACRIM − could not be registered and were therefore 
64 Corte Constitucional, Auto 098 (2013) and Auto 112 (2013).
65 For instance, on the ‘armed conflict’ requirement, see Corte Constitucional, C-781/12 
(2012), C-280/13 (2013) and C-462/13 (2013). 
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excluded from the programme. As a result, these particular IDPs had nowhere 
to register their need for protection since the old IDP registry, which would 
have been able to accommodate them, had been eliminated. The ensuing chaos 
and deficiencies should have been foreseen, as the UN Secretary-General’s 
Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons had 
warned about the effects of differentiation between IDPs several years prior to 
that,66 reiterated by the UNHCR after the reform.67 
Trying to solve the problem in a careful balancing act, the Constitutional 
Court’s Special Chamber on Internal Displacement ruled that, under the 
principle of equality, those displaced by BACRIM should be included in the 
registry and obtain its benefits regarding assistance, attention and protection, 
even though they were materially outside the scope of the law,68 a decision 
welcomed by the OHCHR.69 This represented a correction of a legislative 
mistake that had left a particular group of IDPs with no recourse to assistance 
measures under the concept of a ‘deficit of protection’. Individual judgments 
by the Court in ‘tutela’ suits70 since then have reconfirmed that these IDPs 
should be recorded in the victims’ registry regardless of the nature of the actor 
which caused displacement.71
This positive advance, which has been applauded by public opinion, is not 
as generous as it seems. In its interpretation of that ruling, the Special Chamber 
went to great lengths to clarify its position, noting that individuals displaced by 
BACRIM do indeed have to be included in the victims’ registry but not with 
the full breadth of rights as conflict victims. They are classified in a specific 
second tier, within which they are entitled to ‘assistance, care and protection’ 
like all other IDPs, but not to the ‘truth, justice and reparation’ to which 
victims who can prove a nexus to the armed conflict are entitled.72 This means 
that although they can access assistance mechanisms through the registry, they 
cannot obtain the full protection of their basic rights as victims. 
66 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, Addendum: Mission to 
Colombia’ (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.3, para. 77.
67 UNHCR, ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report – 
Universal Periodic Review: Colombia’ (2013), p. 5.
68 Corte Constitucional, Auto 119 (2013).
69 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Addendum: Situation of Human Rights in Colombia’ (2014) UN Doc A/
HRC/25/19/Add.3, para. 28
70 The tutela is a type of judicial petition that can be presented to any judge to address a 
violation of fundamental rights in an extremely short time, following the wider tradition of 
amparo writs in the Spanish-speaking world.
71 Corte Constitucional, T-006/14 (2014) and T-834/14 (2014).
72 Corte Constitucional, Auto 206 (2013).
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The sole exception to this general rule is in the case where the BACRIM 
actions causing displacement occur ‘in the context of the armed conflict’ and 
have a sufficient linked to it.73 This means that in each individual case the 
adjudicator must examine whether there is a close and sufficient relationship 
between the particular displacement by BACRIM and the armed conflict.74 
Besides the logistical challenge derived from applying this sub-rule to hundreds 
of thousands of individual IDP cases, it is not even clear what exactly these 
judicially constructed concepts mean. 
Due to all of the above, it is clear that although there is indeed a well-
intentioned State effort in Colombia to create fair standards for inclusion and 
provide protection measures, those affected by criminal groups have effectively 
been made second-class victims, and this can be attributed in equal measure to 
a poor institutional design and an unwillingness to recognise the true nature 
of BACRIM groups. Their power structures, sophisticated forms of territorial 
control, comprehensive use of means and methods of combat, and, above all, 
their direct links to the old paramilitary groups, indicate that they are new 
manifestations of old phenomena.75 In that respect, BACRIM are indeed 
parties to the armed conflict and cause civilian displacement in much the 
same way their forebears did. In fact, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
research indicates that these groups were responsible for the lion’s share of mass 
displacements in the country in 2013. What this means, in practice, is that if 
these trends continue, most of the newly displaced individuals will continue 
to be unable to access the Victims’ Law as true victims and will be relegated to 
receiving some of the available forms of assistance and protection only. 
This cautionary tale brings us back to the central question behind the 
interplay between displacement and victimhood: is the condition of victim an 
adequate, or at least an acceptable, proxy for the condition of IDP or refugee? 
It is not. This chapter makes it clear that, in an ideal world, the ‘smoke screen’ 
obfuscating the phenomenon of forced migration in and from Mexico would 
be confronted head-on. The objective should not be to circumvent, but rather 
to remove, the political and legal obstacles to recognition. In this respect, 
the CEAV’s new approach to the subject, although still work in progress, is a 
commendable step with considerable potential to address the needs of displaced 
individuals, as well as the potential for future evolution. In this process, the 
Colombian example clearly shows that including displaced individuals as 
a particular group of victims with special needs and rights within the larger 
universe of victims is good practice, and at the same time highlights the perils 
73 Corte Constitucional, T-129/12 (2012), C-781/12 (2012) and Auto 052/13 (2013).
74 Corte Constitucional, C-781/12 (2012).
75 The Inter-American Commission has analysed the issue of continuity between paramilitary 
groups and BACRIM in IACmHR, ‘Truth, justice and reparation: report on the situation of 
human rights in Colombia’ (2013) OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc.49/13, Chapter 1 B.
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of politicising the definitions that allow or bar these individuals from enjoying 
the full array of rights to be derived from victim status.
Conclusion
From this analysis it is clear that, in the case of Colombia, although there is indeed 
a well-intentioned State effort to create fair protection standards, those affected 
by criminal groups have effectively been made second-rate victims, even though 
the former are arguably new manifestations of old paramilitary groups. Therefore, 
the research demonstrates that the label of ‘non-conflict IDP/victim’, with the 
right to ‘assistance, care and protection’, unfairly discriminates against BACRIM 
victims and limits their access to possibly the only working mechanisms to seek 
‘truth, justice and reparations’. The Colombian experience indicates that a dual 
approach clearly recognising and protecting displaced persons as a particular and 
differentiated species within the wider genus of victims is probably the best strategy 
to account for the complex and diverse profiles of those affected by criminal 
violence. This is because it can help to streamline processes which consider both 
the overall needs of all victims and the specific needs of particular groups.76
In Mexico’s case, although real results still remain to be seen, recent 
developments seem to indicate that the CEAV is either taking up a 
groundbreaking role of its own or quietly reflecting a governmental position that 
is not as closed to the internal displacement issue as it would appear at first 
sight. In either case, the Commission’s work holds considerable promise for a 
new, comprehensive approach to displacement in Mexico that will undoubtedly 
merit future observation. For now, there being little or no recognition that 
displacement can be an independent human rights violation is still a considerable 
barrier to protecting individuals who flee their homes in a preemptive effort to 
escape contexts of indiscriminate violence or insecurity caused by cartel activity. 
However, the Commission’s continuing process of evolution and introspection 
on the displacement issue elicits some hope that, with the right direction and 
incentives, a more complete and systematic approach to it may be on the horizon.
This critique is not intended to denigrate the fact that the Colombian and 
Mexican laws represent extraordinary and commendable steps; they certainly are. 
In different ways, they are both treading new paths in the protection of displaced 
individuals in extremely complex scenarios, and challenges are to be expected. 
What this means is that civil society, academia and international organisations 
now have an opportunity to find ways of fostering a technical and apolitical 
dialogue with these governments in order to maximise these laws’ strengths and 
address their shortcomings.
76 UNGA, ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ (2012), UN Doc 
A/67/289, para. 61.
Note
In the months after the publication of the Spanish version of this volume, 
the Colombian Ministry of Defence adopted Permanent Directive 0015 of 
2016, which eliminated the category of ‘BACRIM’ and replaced it with a 
process to determine if a group was an ‘Organized Armed Group’ (GAO) or 
an ‘Organized Criminal Group’ (GCO). This depends on whether each group 
fulfils the criteria set out under the Directive, which reference International 
Humanitarian Law in the case of GAOs. As a result, GAOs can now be 
subject to the full use of military force and the laws of war. This development, 
however, has not yet translated into a recognition that the Colombian State 
is in an armed conflict with them – or that their victims should be included 
in the framework set out under the Victims’ Law, which would be the logical 
conclusion. Whether this will change in the near future remains to be seen.
